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FIRE SAFETY IN TRANSPORT CATEGORY





F IRES HAVE CAUSED the deaths of many aircraft pas-
sengers, even though the accidents were otherwise surviv-
able.' Post-accident investigation indicates that often these
deaths do not result from fire per se; rather, death results
from the inhalation of smoke and/or other gases.2
The Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's) set forth safety
standards pertaining to aircraft fire safety.3 In order to ob-
tain an airworthiness certificate, an aircraft manufacturer
must comply with these FAR's;4 likewise, operators of trans-
port category aircraft must meet certain standards in the op-
* Mr. Foss is a senior associate with Lord, Bissell and Brook and an active pilot for
United Airlines. He specializes in the area of air carrier and operator defense litiga-
tion. He graduated magna cum laude from Loyola University Law School of Chicago
in 1975, where he served on law review. He then served as law clerk to the Honorable
Alfred Y. Kirkland, Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois.
** Mr. Tepper is an associate with Lord, Bissell and Brook specializing in the area
of aviation law. He graduated with high distinction from The John Marshall Law
School in 1982. He then served as law clerk to the Honorable Howard C. Ryan, Chief
Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court.
I For purposes of this article, we define "survivable" or "impact survivable" as an
accident in which passengers and crew survive the deceleration of stopping.
2 See infra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
:1 FAA Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes, 14 C.F.R. §§ 25.-
851, 25.1181, 25.1207, 25.1451 (1984).
1 Id at §§ 25.1 - .1587 (1984).
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eration of such aircraft.5 These regulations are the starting
point in an analysis of fire safety liability.6
This article will discuss those FAR's which relate to air-
craft fire safety in transport category aircraft.7 It will then
briefly focus on liability for violation of FAR's, as well as
other standards of care to which investigation of aircraft
cabin fires relates.' This article will conclude with a discus-
sion of whether the FAR method of testing fire resistance in-
creases the likelihood that passengers will survive a
"survivable" accident. 9
II. CERTIFICATION STANDARDS FOR TRANSPORT
CATEGORY AIRCRAFT
In order to obtain an airworthiness certificate for a trans-
port category aircraft, ° certain federal requirements must be
met. These include, zter ah'a, flight capability, performance
characteristics, maneuverability, stability, power plant re-
quirements and fire protection. These standards, the Federal
Aviation Regulations, have been established by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Department of
Transportation. They are published in the Code of Federal
Regulations. "
A. General FAR's Apph'cable to Transport Categor Aircraft
Although a commercial aircraft may be legally produced
and operated once the FARs have been satisfied, a compo-
nent which meets the regulations may not necessarily meet an
objective "reasonable man" standard.' 2 Compliance alone,
Id.
Id §§ 25.851, 25.1181, 25.1207, 25.1451 (1984).
See infra notes 57-75 and accompanying text.
See infia notes 76-105 and accompanying text.
See trn/a notes 63, 72, 132, 154 and accompanying text.
A transport category airplane is any airplane certificated under 14 C.F.R. § 25.
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., DEP'T OF TRANSP., FAA GLOSSARY 40 (1975).
1 Title 14, Aeronautics and Space, includes all FAR's. Section 25 governs airworthi-
ness standards for transport category airplanes. 14 C.F.R. §§ 25.1-.1587 (1984).
' It would be a stout-hearted manufacturer indeed that would rely on having met
the letter of a FAR as its primary defense at trial. In Noel v. United Aircraft Corp.,
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therefore, may not shield a manufacturer or an operator from
liability.
Several general certification standards apply to fire safety
as well as other areas of flight safety. In general, to meet cer-
tification standards, the manufacturer must show that the de-
sign features of its transport aircraft are not "hazardous" or
"unreliable."'1 3 The cabin must have at least one door which
can be opened from outside or inside even if people are
crowded against the door.14 Furthermore, the door must be
marked and located so that it can be found and operated in
darkness. 15 Ventilation must ensure that the crew and pas-
senger compartments are kept free from harmful concentra-
tions of gases or vapors even with malfunctions. 16
B. Specifc Fire Safety Requirements Appicable to Transport
Category Aircraft
The composition of parts which could adversely affect
safety must be of suitable and durable material.' 7 Crew and
passenger compartment interior materials must meet specific
219 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1963), afdin part and rem'd in part, 342 F.2d 232 (3rd Cir.
1964), appeal on other grounds, 359 F.2d 671 (3rd Cir. 1966), the district court stated:
The fact that the propeller system on [the subject aircraft] was certified
by FAA is certainly evidence in favor of United but it is not controlling.
It did not relieve United from the continuing duty to improve its propel-
lor system in view of the factor of human safety involved. If certification
were a defense, United need never have attempted to improve its propel-
lor system after the date of certification. United concedes that certifica-
tion is not binding on the Court but that the circumstances of each case
control. It would be futile to defend an auto crash for the defendant to
rely on the fact that he had taken a driver's training course and held an
operator's license. The defense of certification per se is equally futile.
219 F. Supp. at 574.
', 14 C.F.R. § 25.601 (1984).
,4 Id. § 25.783(b). Most transport category aircraft manufacturers base the number
of doors in a given aircraft on seat capacity.
Id. § 25.783.
Id § 25.831.
,7 14 C.F.R. § 25.603 provides that:
The suitability and durability of materials used for parts, the failure of
which could adversely affect safety, must
(a) Be established on the basis of experience or tests;
(b) Conform to approved specifications (such as industry or military
specifications, or Technical Standard Orders) that ensure their having
the strength and other properties assumed in the design data; and
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criteria for self-extinguishing qualities and flammability.
18
Items such as ceiling panels, storage compartments, floor cov-
erings, seat cushions, galley furnishings, electrical conduit, in-
sulation, air ducts, motion picture film, windows and waste
disposal receptacles must satisfy these requirements.19
Cargo and baggage compartments are also subject to fire
safety regulations. Those compartments which are not acces-
sible by crew or passengers must have interiors that meet oxy-
gen, flammability, and/or detection and protection
requirements. 20 Furthermore, each cargo compartment must
comply with the requirements of section 25.857,21 which es-
tablishes separate standards for compartments by class. A
class "A" cargo compartment is one which is readily observa-
ble and accessible by a crew member who could easily dis-
cover a fire. A class "B" cargo compartment is not
necessarily observable, but permits access so that a crew
member could reach any part of the compartment with a
hand-held fire extinguisher. Smoke or heat detectors are re-
quired in order to provide notice to crew members. Class
"C" compartments are remote, inaccessible compartments
which, consequently, must contain smoke or fire detection
systems and provide fire extinguishing equipment. A class
"D" compartment, also remote, is one designed to extinguish
fire by suffocation.22 The compartment must therefore be
constructed so that hazardous quantities of smoke, flames,
noxious gases and extinguishing agents cannot enter the crew
or passenger portion of the aircraft.
Precautions are also required in areas where flammable
(c) Take into account the effects of environmental conditions, such as
temperature and humidity, expected in service.
"Suitable" and "durable" are not further defined within the regulations themselves.
Hence, the courts must be the ultimate arbiter of these terms.
I. § 25.853.
Id
, ,d. §§ 25.855, .857.
Id. § 25.857. Section 25.857 classifies cargo compartments based on their accessi-
bility, the availablilty of smoke and fire detection equipment, whether the fire extin-
guishing equipment is built in, the type of ventilation, the ability to exclude smoke,
flame or gases, and the ability to confine fire. Flight tests must be performed to
demonstrate compliance with these provisions. Id. § 25.855(e).
2 Id §§ 25.855, .857.
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fluid system leaks could present a danger from fluids or va-
pors. Precautions taken must minimize the chances for igni-
tion of fluids or vapors and/or minimize the danger which
could result if such ignition occurs. 23
The regulations designate various parts of the engine and
accessory section as fire zones. As such, these areas must meet
rigid fire safety standards. 24 All fire zones must be designed
to provide drainage and ventilation to minimize the hazards
from flammable fluids and vapors.25 Components which
carry flammable fluids in an area potentially subject to fire
conditions or in a designated "fire area" must be made of fire
resistant materials.26 Generally, tanks or reservoirs which
contain flammable fluids may be placed in a fire zone as long
as safety features provide the same level of safety which
would be likely were the component outside the zone.27
Fire zones must be equipped with shut-off valves which
stop the flow of flammable fluids where necessary, yet allow
for continuing operation of the aircraft.2 8  The engine and
nacelle area must be equipped with a fire extinguishing sys-
tem.29 The extinguishing system employed must be capable
of putting out the fire, while at the same time isolating toxic
fumes from the crew and passenger compartments. 30 All fire
zones must contain fire detection systems.3
The failure of certain aircraft systems and components
pose a threat to flight safety; these systems and components
must be designed so that failure due to fire is extremely im-
probable.3 2  Consequently, flight controls and other struc-
23 Id § 25.863. Flammable fluids include hydraulic fluids and oils, as well as engine
fuels.
- Id § 25.1181.
25 Id § 25.1187.
'1 Id § 25.1183.
- Id § 25.1185. The FAR's do not specifically define the level of safety which must
be met.
11 Id § 25.1189. For example, fuel valves can stop the flow of fuel through one area,
yet permit fuel to still reach the engine by using an alternate route.
" Id § 25.1195. The nacelle is the engine housing.




806 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
tures which could fail if subjected to the effects of the fire
must be shielded or constructed of fireproof material. 3 To
protect the electrical system from fire and smoke, the electri-
cal cables which are used during emergency procedures must
be fire-resistant.* Main power cables must function even
with "a reasonable degree" of deformity and stretching. All
wire insulation must be self-extinguishing. Likewise, oxygen
systems must not be located in a designated fire zone nor in-
stalled so that escaping oxygen could cause ignition.3 ' As
previously discussed, hydraulic systems utilizing flammable
fluids must meet applicable fire protection requirements. 36
C. Recent Developments and Proposed Regulations in the Area of
Fire Safety for Transport Category Aircraft
Recent developments in the area of aircraft fire safety illus-
trate certain deficiencies, as well as efforts on the part of in-
terested groups37 and the FAA to require stricter standards.
The FAA is now considering a proposed regulation requiring
smoke detection equipment in aircraft lavatories, recognizing
that, statistically, this is a likely place for cabin fires to origi-
nate. In December 1983, Pan American World Airways be-
gan installing automatic fire extinguishers in all aircraft
lavatory waste bins.38 The project was scheduled for comple-
tion in spring of this year. 9
The FAA has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
which would establish more stringent flammablility require-
ments for seat cushions used in transport category aircraft.4"
FAA accident investigation and tests suggest that some air-
craft seat cushions and upholstery which presently appear to
:... Id. § 25.865.
:,4 Id. § 25.1359.
Id § 25.1451.
Id. § 25.1435(c); for discussion, see supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 133, 157-160 and accompanying text.
" Pan American Insialhhg Smoke Detectors, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH. 26 (January 2,
1984).
Id
FAA Flammability Requirements for Aircraft Seat Cushions, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,250
(1983).
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satisfy the requirements of section 25.853 of the FAR's41
nonetheless rapidly decompose, permitting the interior foam
cores to burn.4 2 The cushions are characteristically con-
structed of a fire-retardant polyurethane foam core covered
with upholstery. Although both materials are certified to
have passed the flammability tests of section 25.853, the up-
holstery cannot withstand the flame of a significant fire and
the foam core spreads the fire rapidly.43
In response to findings and recommendations of the Spe-
cial Aviation Fire and Explosion Reductions (SAFER) Advi-
sory Committee,44  the FAA is considering proposed
requirements for the use of materials in aircraft seat cushions
which would form a fire blocking layer, thereby reducing the
spread of fire, smoke and toxic gas emissions.45 Fire blocking
involves the use of a thin layer of markedly more fire resistant
material to encapsulate and protect the foam core of a seat
cushion. 46 This delays the ignition of the cushion and signifi-
cantly slows the spread of fire.47 These proposed require-
ments would add to the flammability requirements now
contained in the FAR's.
48
Possibly in answer to the need for more effective fire safety
regulations, the Civil Aeronautics Board has adopted new
rules to regulate smoking on board aircraft. 49 The rules ban
smoking altogether on small aircraft and ban cigar and pipe
See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
4 48 Fed. Reg. 46,250 (1983).
4:1 Id
44 Id. See thfra notes 150-165 and accompanying text.
4r, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,250 (1983).
46 Id
47 Id
4,, Id. at 46,250-51 (1983). In fact, a recent FAA study indicates that the use of a
blocking material could increase survivable evacuation time as much as 60 percent.
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., DEP'T OF TRANSP., DOT/FAA/CT-83/43, AIRCRAFT
SEAT FIRE BLOCKING LAYERS; EFFECTIVENESS AND BENEFITS UNDER VARIOUS FIRE
SCENARIOS 33 (1984) [hereinafter cited as AIRCRAFT SEAT REPORT]. According to
this report, if seat blocking had been used in the 1980 Saudi Arabian Airlines loss, for
example, see Mnjra note 134, approximately $49,000,000 and 301 lives would have been
saved. Id. at 35.
41 Smoking Aboard Aircraft, 49 Fed. Reg. 25,420 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R.
§ 252) (effective July 10, 1984).
19841
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smoking on all flights.5 ° All smoking is banned when an air-
craft's ventilation system is not functioning properly.5
III. LIABILITY FOR FIRES IN TRANSPORT CATEGORY
AIRCRAFT Vis A VIS THE FEDERAL AVIATION
REGULATIONS
There are three primary avenues of liability arising from
fire in transport category aircraft. One is against the govern-
ment for negligence or carelessness in the course of inspecting
the aircraft pursuant to regulations or for certification under
the regulations. In addition, the operator and/or the manu-
facturer may be liable for violations of the regulations or
other standards.
FAR certification requirements are adopted by the govern-
ment in its discretion. Under the present day interpretation
of the "discretionary function defense" of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 52 the government has no liability for failure to
promulgate a regulation or for a regulation which is not as
good as it might be." A recent decision has held the FAA
immune from suit where it exercised its discretion not to in-
spect.54 Liability arguably attaches when the government
I d. at §§ 252.4-.5.
Id. at § 252.3.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FTCA]. The discretionary
function exception is found at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). For the language of the
exception, see infra note 53. The seminal cases on the subject of the discretionary func-
tion defense are Delehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), and Indian Towing Co.
v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
r :, Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1981). The United States is
protected from claims which are "based upon the exercise or performance or the fail-
ure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty . . . whether or not the
discretion involved be abused." Id at 1064.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982) states that:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this Title shall not
apply to. . . [alny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee
of the government exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an em-
ployee of the government whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.
. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),
104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
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performs an actual inspection and does so in a negligent man-
ner.55 But when the FAA omits an inspection for policy rea-
sons, the discretionary function exception completely bars
actions brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.5"
An airline, as a common carrier, customarily owes the
highest degree of care to passengers.57 Compliance with the
letter of the FAR's does not necessarily shield an operator
from liability. 58 Conversely, violation of the FAR's can, in
certain jurisdictions, constitute negligence per se or otherwise
act to shift a burden of proof.59 Thus, an unexcused violation
of these standards may enhance operator liability. °
In many states, a manufacturer may be liable under strict
liability concepts which frequently require less effort to assert
than negligence. Circumstances may exist, however, which
limit actions against a manufacturer to negligence concepts."
While the manufacturer is exposed to traditional standards of
Id at 2765-69.
" Id. at 2768.
57 United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 389 (9th Cir. 1964).
- Dillingham, Crashworthiness FAR's and the Efct of Compliance in Product Liability Ac-
tions Involving Airplanes, 33 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 55, 57 (1982).
11 In Gantenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 407 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1968), the plain-
tiffs' decedents were passengers on a single engine charter flight operated by defend-
ants. The pilot involved operated the aircraft below Visual Flight Rule minimums, in
violation of FAA regulations. Id at 447. In applying Pennsylvania law, the court held
that "a common carrier owes its passengers the duty of exercising the highest degree of
care. This duty is violated by negligence per se which arises from the violation of a
governmental safety regulation." Id. at 446 (citations omitted).
There are two forms for instructing a jury regarding violations of FAR's. In one
form, the jury is instructed that if a violation of a FAR is found, and is causal, negli-
gence is thereby established without further analysis of the defendant's conduct. In the
other, the jury is instructed that once violation of a FAR is shown, the defendant must
establish that the violation did not proximately cause the loss.
1' Delta Air Lines v. United States, 561 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1064 (1978). See also supra notes 12, 52 and accompanying text.
- An example of such circumstances can be found in a suit instituted by a large air
carrier against a large air carrier manufacturer in the Ninth Circuit. Strict liability is
not available as a liability theory as between sophisticated commercial entities where
the entities negotiated the sale between themselves. Scandinavian Airlines v. United
Aircraft, 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979); c.f. Delta Airlines v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238
Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Delta Airlines v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975)
(actions in negligence and strict liability barred by exculpatory clause in contract).
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care imposed by law, it, like the operator, may bear a heavier
obligation where FAR's are violated.
In McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,62 the plaintiff sustained inju-
ries in the crash of a 1968 Cessna 177 Cardinal. The plaintiff
asserted in part that the fuel system of the aircraft was unsafe.
Although McGee and three other passengers occupied the
aircraft when it crashed, no occupant suffered major injuries
as a result of the crash itself.63 McGee suffered extensive
third degree burns and other injuries which were a result of
the ensuing post-crash fire.64 McGee sued on a crashworthi-
ness basis, seeking in part to shift the burden to the manufac-
turer to show the product was not defective once the claimant
made a prima facie showing that her injuries were proxi-
mately caused by the product's design.65 The trial court en-
tered judgment in favor of the manufacturer, but the
appellate court reversed.66 After a second trial, judgment was
once again entered for the manufacturer and another appeal
taken.67
The plaintiff appealed the second time in part from the
trial court's refusal to give a proffered instruction which
stated that if the jury found that the defendant-aircraft man-
ufacturer had violated one or more of the regulations con-
tained in Part 23 of the FAR's, 6 the burden of proof on the
issue of proximate cause shifted from the plaintiff to the de-
fendant. Thus, the defendant would have the burden of
proving that the plaintiff's injuries and damages were not the
proximate result of any violation of the FAR's. 69 The appel-
late court again ruled for the plaintiff and against the manu-
facturer. The court stated that by proving that the
defendant-manufacturer violated the FAR and that the in-
, 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978).




McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 139 Cal. App. 3d 179, 188 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983).
- Section 23 governs airworthiness standards for normal, utility and acrobatic cate-
gory airplanes. 14 C.F.R. § 23 (1984).
- 188 Cal. Rptr. at 547 n.6.
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jury resulted from an occurrence which the FAR was
designed to prevent, the plaintiff brought herself within the
class of persons to be protected by the statute. The only re-
maining issue was whether violation of the FAR proximately
caused the injury.7 ° The court determined that violation of
the FARs is sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the
injury was proximately caused by the product's design, thus
shifting the burden to the defendant to show that the product
was not defective.71
McGee had presented evidence to show that the ensuing
fire caused her injuries and that the fire was able to enter the
cockpit of the aircraft due to components which were not in
compliance with the FAR's. 72 The appellate court held that
this violation was sufficient evidence to shift the burden of
proof to the manufacturer. 73 The FAR's then in force re-
quired engine fires to be isolated from the cockpit by the fire-
wall for fifteen minutes. 74 This regulation set a standard for
safety which the manufacturer failed to meet.75
IV. AIRCRAFT FIRE INVESTIGATION
Aircraft fire investigation is an art unto itself. Generally,
when an aircraft accident is investigated, efforts are focused
on the cause of the crash. Crash investigators historically
have not been fire investigators. In order to effectively evalu-
ate and litigate aircraft fires, it is necessary to separate the
crash from the fire. Determining fire causation, origin and
manner of propagation frequently have little to do with
traditional aircraft accident investigation. Hence, a fire spe-
cialist is needed. Once causation, origin and manner of prop-
agation are determined, possible liability under the FAR's
can be assessed. Only then can it be determined whether the
regulations were satisfied and whether operators and manu-
-o Id at 547.
7, Id at 548.
7' Id.
': Id at 549.
'4 Id at 546. The requirement has not changed. 14 C.F.R. § 23.1191 (1984).
7 , McGee, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 542, 550.
1984]
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facturers of transport category aircraft have complied with
statutory standards.
A. Determining the Origin of a Fire
The first step in fire investigation is securing the scene
against entry until the investigator arrives. Whenever possi-
ble, the fire scene should be preserved until the fire investiga-
tor has completed his work.76  All available information
about the fire should be gathered, including information
from the fire department personnel responding to the fire and
information from eyewitnesses." Efforts should be made to
isolate the material that was first ignited, noting both its com-
position, such as fabric or liquid, and its form or use, such as
fuel, paint or component. 78 Efforts should also be directed to
determine precisely how the heat and material combined to
ignite. 79
In some instances, the point of fire origin is obvious.8 ° If
the structure is totally destroyed prior to extinguishment,
however, the point of origin can be difficult to determine.8
In such cases, a thorough investigation of the exterior and
interior of the structure must be conducted. 2 Fire damaged
areas which show charring and smoke deposits should be ex-
amined. Smoke, along with char patterns, will help to deter-
mine whether the fire started on the inside or the outside of
the structure and which elements influenced the spread of the
fire. 3 The interior examination generally begins with the
least damaged area, working towards the area of most severe
7,; NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, HAND-
BOOK No. 134, FIRE INVESTIGATION HANDBOOK 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FIRE
INVESTIGATION HANDBOOK].
7 Id
71 Id. at 2. An example of the source of heat ignition would be the particular piece
of equipment that provided the heat required to start a fire; examples of the form of
such heat include flame, spark or hot surface. Id.
79 Id.
- Id. at 3.
81 Id.
a2 Id at 1, 3-7.
" Id at 1, 3-4.
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damage.8 4 The most severely burned or damaged area is gen-
erally near the point of fire origination. 5 To precisely deter-
mine origin, the investigator will attempt to establish the
lowest point of burning.8 6 The lowest point of burning is im-
portant because fire generally travels upwards and outwards
as it propagates from the lowest point, leaving a v-shaped
pattern on nearby or adjacent walls."7 This pattern can,
however, be influenced by pressurization systems and their
resultant airflow. 8 A trained fire investigator can also deter-
mine whether the fire developed slowly or rapidly by study-
ing patterns on the areas exposed to fire as well as ceiling
damage.8 9
The ceiling, light fixtures, and light bulbs over the appar-
ent area of fire origin may provide information regarding the
direction of heat flow and the degree of heat. 90 For example,
the condition of glass objects and window glass may give
some indication as to the location of the fire and its intensity
as well as the rate of build-up.9" Light bulbs swell and distort
when exposed to high temperatures.92 This distortion may
cause the glass bulbs to bubble out in the direction of heat.93
Soot, smoke deposits and crazing of glass are all indicators of
fire location, intensity and rate of heat buildup. 94
Flashover, the rapid propagation of flame, occurs where
heat builds up at the ceiling level, causing rapid ignition of
materials below. This can cause a fire to propagate signifi-




- Strong airflow can cause fire to move downward, sideways, or in other abnormal
patterns, thereby creating a trap for the unwary. Normal airflow patterns within the
aircraft must consequently be ascertained. See FIRE INVESTIGATION HANDBOOK, supra
note 76, at 1, 83-85.
- Id at 1, 5-7.




Id at 5. "Crazing" describes the small cracks which appear in the surface of glass
as result of heat.
1984]
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cant distances. 95 Flashfire is a mild explosion caused by the
ignition of combustible gases given off by burning material.
Once the build-up of gas reaches its flammable limit, the fire
itself will cause ignition; ignition is usually at the ceiling level
because most gases rise.96 Put simply, flashover depends on
the amount of heat which collects and radiates at the upper
level of the cabin while flashfire is governed by the amount of
flammable gases which collect in the cabin.97 Airflow
through the cabin can disperse these build-ups and reduce or
postpone the chances of flashfire.98 When ceiling tempera-
tures reach the flashover point, the resulting fire may appear
to have multiple fire origins. 99
B. Determining the Cause of the Fire
When determining the cause of a fire, the investigator will
customarily gather available evidence for later evaluation,
including samples from locations within the fire area.°° The
investigator's visual observations should be documented by
the use of photographs. In particular, he seeks to document
fire development characteristics for later use."10
Determining cause is frequently accomplished by the pro-
cess of elimination: the investigator attempts to eliminate po-
tential causes until only one or two remain.1" 2 Another
approach is the reverse, whereby the investigator may seek to
- Official Transcript at 603, In re Investigation of Accident Involving Air Canada
DC-9, of Canadian Registry CF-TLU, at the Greater Cincinnati Airport, Covington,
Kentucky, June 2, 1983, No. SA-480, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd. (August 16, 1983) (testi-
mony of Richard G. Hill, FAA Fire Investigator) [hereinafter cited as Investigation of
Air Canada Accident].
- Id at 603-05.
- Id at 607.
'8Id
See FIRE INVESTIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 76, at 6. Since the heat of the fire
is generally concentrated at the ceiling level, floors seldom receive damage similar to
that received by ceilings. A large, damaged area of floor, however, could indicate the
use of accelerants, or that plastics or other decorations were consumed in the fire, giv-
ing the appearance of flammable liquid burn. Id. at 5.
- Id. at 22-23.
- Id. at 27.
-2 Id at 8.
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directly discover what produced ignition. 03 Both approaches
have merit and may be used in combination."0 4
Regardless of the method employed in determining cause,
the investigator should always keep in mind the fundamental
physics and chemistry of a fire. ' °5 Three elements are neces-
sary for fire to exist: fuel, oxygen and sufficient source of heat
to cause the fuel and oxygen to react and ignite. ' 6 Once
combustion begins, heat transfer can take place by convec-
tion (the movement of hot fire gases away from the fire
source), by conduction (the heating of solid surface in con-
tact with hot gases), or by radiant heat transfer (the heating
caused by electromagnetic radiation or waves, such as the
warming of the earth's surface by the sun's rays).' 7 These
three methods are classic examples of heat transfer or fire ex-
tension. Another method by which fire can spread, however,
is the movement of flaming or heated material.' 8 This move-
ment occurs when burning materials such as paper are car-
ried aloft by the hot plume of the fire and then deposited in
another location.' 9 This transfer can mislead a fire investi-
gator into postulating that multiple fires occurred." 0
Another basic principle is that fire develops from the igni-
tion of combustible substances. Flaming ignition occurs
when ignition is caused by matches, heating equipment,
cooking equipment or other types of flame."' Non-flaming
ignition occurs from smoldering combustion such as a care-
lessly discarded cigarette. ' 2 Smoldering combustion can
reach the point where flames erupt, making it difficult to de-
termine whether a smoldering ignition or a flaming ignition
'3 Id
I d.
' See id at 9.
Id. at 146. Heating equipment, cooking equipment, smoking materials, electrical
equipment, appliances, bleed air of engines, and wiring are all possible heat sources in
transport aircraft. Id. at 9.
.... Id at 155-56.
.... Id at 157-59.
- Id.
1io Id
... Id. at 88-90.
I- d. at 91.
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was the initial cause in cases where both were potentially
present."
3
Spontaneous ignition is the ignition of material without
any external application of heat. This usually involves the
build-up of heat within the subject material over a period of
time."1 4 This can occur because materials themselves either
are reactive or become active through the use of additives. ,
5
Heat buildup can also result from the storage of hot
materials.' 16
Electricity is also a common ignition source, for heat is cus-
tomarily produced within electrical systems and may build to
the point where it can cause damage." 7 This may result in a
system failure or ignition of the system itself."8 The two
main categories of electrical fires are those originating within
an electrical distribution system and those originating within
electrical equipment.' '9 The occurrence of an electrical short
can produce sparks sufficient to ignite some combustible
materials.' 20 If it is possible that the fire was electrical in ori-
gin, the investigator should attempt to focus on the particular
mechanism that could have caused ignition.' 2 '
Some of the elements which determine the speed of devel-
opment and growth of fire include the ignition source, prox-
imity, type and amount of fuel and other combustible
material, as well as the quantity of air available.' 22 Growth
involves the spread of flame along the ignited material as well
as spread from one item to another.' 23 The type of material
Id at 93.
' Id at 94.
' Id. at 94-96. For example, if vegetable oil on a rag is exposed to air, it reacts to
oxygen, releasing heat in the process. It can thereby ignite. Id at 96.
, Id at 95.
'" Id at 99.
81H Id Heat buildup may damage some portion of the system, resulting in the failure
of the system itself or ignition of the system or both. Id.
19 Id. at 99.





involved and its location are important to the analysis. 114
The more closely spaced the combustible materials are to
each other the greater the potential for rapid fire spread.'25
Once the fire has developed and has begun to grow, its
power is determined, in part, by the enclosure in which it is
contained. 126 Reradiation and ventilation are the primary in-
fluences imposed by the enclosure.' 27 Reradiation takes place
when trapped hot gases in the upper portion of the room heat
the ceiling and walls, causing the surfaces to radiate heat
onto unburned fuel, thus making the fire spread faster. 2 '
When radiation levels become high enough, flashover oc-
curs, l1 9 causing combustible materials within the room to
burst into flames.
130
The air supply to a fire, a key determinant of growth, is
also a function of the enclosure. The rate of burning within
an enclosed area will often become so great that the amount
of air may be inadequate. Thus, flames may reach out
through an opening in the enclosure, seeking more air and
materials to burn. The effects of this "ventilation-controlled
fire" should be apparent to the investigator because fire
characteristicly consumes all available fuel. Consequently, a
ventilation-controlled fire is not easily confused with a fire of
multiple origins. 131
V. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELIABILITY OF FAR'S
IN PROMOTING AIR SAFETY
An FAA study of aircraft cabin fire safety published in
June, 1980 concluded that thirty-nine percent of all fatalities
in survivable accidents were the result of fire.' 3 2 The report
*2 Id. For example, carpeting is very combustible while oak flooring is not as com-
bustible. Id
-, Id at 161.
126 Id
"21 Id at 162.
'5 See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
-o FIRE INVESTIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 76, at 162.
':" Id at 162-163. For a discussion of flashover, see supra notes 95-99 and accompa-
nying text.
,:12 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., DEP'T OF TRANSP., FAA-ED-18-7, TECHNICAL RE-
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also states that the FAA emphasized research in the area of
the post-crash cabin fire as opposed to an uncontrollable in-
flight fire because most in-flight fires can be controlled by
crew members.133 In view of the Saudi Arabian Airlines
losses of August 1980, where 301 persons died, and the DC-9
Air Canada accident of June 1983, where twenty-three per-
sons died, 134 we think this conclusion is subject to criticism.
A modern wide-body jet contains approximately 11,000
pounds of non-metallic material including various plastic
foams used for aircraft seating. 135 These foams are classified
as highly flammable. 136 Much of this foam is treated with a
fire retardant which changes the foam's initial reaction to
fire. Although the treated foam is harder to ignite, once ig-
nited it may burn more rapidly than untreated foam.
Treated foam may produce more smoke and as much carbon
monoxide and hydrogen cyanide as the untreated version. 137
Thus, although treated foam may pass ignitability tests, such
tests do not disclose the treated foam's performance in a ma-
jor fire. 38
The major problems evolving from a cabin fire - smoke,
high temperatures, depletion of oxygen and production of
toxic gases - are all hazards of fire involving foam. Burning
plastic produces hot, dense smoke with a temperature some-
times as high as 900 degrees centigrade. Such temperatures
can be fatal even if only a thin layer of smoke collects near
PORT, ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PLAN, AIRCRAFT CABIN FIRE
SAFETY, V, 1 (1980).
'%) Id. at 1.
,:,4 On August 19, 1980, a Lockheed L-1011 TriStar, operated by Saudi Arabian
Airline, had to return to Riyadh Airport, Saudi Arabia. Investigators determined that
an uncontrolled fire developed in a cargo compartment of the aircraft. PRESIDENCY
OF CIVIL AVIATION (SAUDI ARABIA), AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT: SAUDI ARABIAN
AIRLINE, LOCKHEED L-101 1, HZ-AHK, RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA, AUGUST 19, 1980, 1
(1982). Toxic fumes, including carbon monoxide, were produced by burning materi-
als. These fumes were inhaled by the aircraft occupants. Id. at 77. The 301 persons on
board the aircraft were killed. Id at 1. For a discussion of DC-9 Air Canada accident,
see tnfia note 166 and accompanying text.





the top of the cabin. 139 The oxygen depletion caused by fire
can be fatal. Some foams, when burned within a confined
area, reduce the oxygen level significantly in a short period of
time. 140
Synergism, the combining of toxic gases, is also an aspect of
a cabin fire that must be considered. The effects of synergism
were recognized almost twenty years ago. On November 11,
1965, a Boeing 727 carrying eighty-five passengers and six
crewmembers crashed while landing at Salt Lake City Mu-
nicipal Airport. Forty-eight people survived.' 4 ' Correspon-
dence attached to this accident report among the FAA's
Director of Flight Standards Service, the Bureau of Safety
and the FAA indicated that emissions of heavy smoke and
toxic gases caused by burning of interior furnishings contrib-
uted to many deaths. 4 2 The correspondence further reflected
that deficiencies were discovered in materials then used for
aircraft cabin interiors although superior materials were
available. 143  The author of the correspondence made no
mention of specific deficiencies, other than to state that the
cabin materials produced various toxic gases and heavy
smoke which contributed to fatalities.'44 Another piece of
correspondence dated almost twenty years ago opined that
140 Id
14. Id
14 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, DEP'T OF TRANSP., DOCKET No. SA-388, FILE No.
1-0032, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT 1 (1966). The aircraft impacted 335 feet short
of the runway threshold shearing the main landing gear and causing the aircraft to
slide approximately 2,838 feet on the nose gear and the bottom of the fuselage. Ap-
proximately one to two seconds after impact, those survivors seated in the aft portion
of the cabin observed a fire erupt in the cabin. Id. at 8. Although all emergency exits
were available for use, passengers attempted to exit primarily by the entry door,
thereby delaying efforts to open it. Id. at 8. Of the ninety-one persons on board the
aircraft, fifty were evacuated after the crash. The remaining forty-one occupants were
overcome by smoke, heat and flames, rendering them unable to escape from the air-
craft. Altogether there were forty-three fatal injuries and forty-eight survivors includ-
ing the crew. Id. at 3. The Civil Aeronautics Board concluded that the physical
impact did not render the passengers incapable of escaping the aircraft. In fact, the
passengers reached the forward exit ahead of the stewardess and delayed her from
commencing evacuation. Id at 12.
142 Id
,.:I Id
4 Id. The correspondence also noted that combinations of various toxic gases pro-
duce a more serious effect than one gas alone.
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the FAR's should be updated to require more fire resistant
materials. 45 Moreover, the Civil Aeronautics Board recom-
mended to the FAA that research be undertaken to decrease
the flammability and smoke characteristics of materials used
in aircraft cabins. 4 6 Although the effects of synergism are
not completely understood, it is postulated that exposure to
combinations of gases can produce a more serious effect than
exposure to each of the gases alone.147
Problems also result from a practice whereby operators
customarily purchase aircraft seats directly from the seat
manufacturer for installation by the airframe manufacturer.
Boeing eliminated the use of certain plastics from production
of their aircraft because of smoke considerations, even though
these plastics passed ignition tests.' 48 Seat manufacturers,
however, continue to use these same materials in their
products. 149
The Special Aviation Fire and Explosion Reduction
145 Id The correspondence was dated December, 1965.
- Id
4' Id at 299. Synergism also played a role in a 1973 occurrence near Orly Airport,
France. On July 11, 1973, near Orly Airport, a Varig Boeing 707 experienced an in-
flight fire which had commenced in a rear lavatory. Department of Transp. (Fr.), Final
Report of the Investigation Committee on the Accident of the Boeing 707 PP- VJZ of the Varig
Company at Saulx-les-Charteaux, on July 11, 1973, 1976-No. 17 OFFICIAL J. FRENCH RE-
PUBLIC (AD. Doc. ED.) 3 (April 6, 1976) (Berlitz Services Trans.) The pilot made an
emergency descent and intentionally crash landed approximately five kilometers short
of the airport with 117 passengers and seventeen crew members on board. Id at 3, 22.
The landing was a success, and the fuselage received little damage. Id. at 15, 20. Wit-
nesses reported that the fire in the cabin was "not a raging fire." It nonetheless ad-
vanced slowly but steadily from the rear of the fuselage to the front, and generated a
great amount of smoke. Id at 22. According to two survivors, smoke coming from the
lavatory filled the aircraft cabin. Eventually a flashfire occurred from the buildup of
combustible gases. Id. at 21.
Pathological findings resulting from this accident indicated that approximately sev-
enty-eight percent of the deaths were the result of carbon monoxide inhalation; carbon
monoxide inhalation could not be ruled out as a cause of the other thirteen percent of
the deaths. Id at 18.
The Board concluded that the accident was survivable. The majority of occupants,
however, were unable to leave the aircraft under their own power even though all exits
were usable. Id. at 22-23. The Board believed that occupants of the cabin were uncon-
scious at the time of landing or otherwise incapable of reacting, although the majority
were believed alive at touchdown. Only the cockpit crew and two stewards were physi-
cally able to leave the aircraft unassisted. Id. at 23.
" See Horsfall, supra note 135, at 299.
4 Id. at 299-300.
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(SAFER) Advisory Committee1 50 conducted a study into the
factors affecting aircraft fire safety, occupant survivability
and safety improvement.' 51 The Committee concentrated its
efforts on survivable accidents where control of fire and ex-
plosion would enhance the ability of occupants to escape the
aircraft.'52 They gave specific attention to problems which
affect the ability to escape a post-crash fire and to possible
solutions. '53
The SAFER Advisory Committee found that the safety
record of U.S. scheduled air carriers showed a general de-
crease in accident and fatality rates over the past fifteen
years. The Committee found, however, that there have been
a significant number of fatal or serious injuries in survivable
accidents where post-crash fires occurred. 154  It determined
that the primary cause of post-crash fire was spilled fuel.
155
In-flight cabin fires producing fatal injuries were determined
to be relatively rare events. 156 The Committee felt that the
available data base on aircraft fire accidents and incidents
was inadequate to isolate the critical chain of events and that
information on the hazards presented by combustible cabin
materials Vis-a-vis spilled fuel was not defined to the point
where the degree of safety improvement obtainable from im-
proved materials could be judged. 5 7 The Committee deter-
mined that there was no accepted method to test and predict
how various materials will behave in a large scale fire. The
- The FAA established the SAFER Advisory Committee on June 26, 1978. The
Committee examined the factors which affect an aircraft passenger's ability to survive
in a post-crash environment and possible solutions for reducing the severity of oc-
curence of aircraft fires and explosions. I FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., DEP'T OF
TRANSP., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL AVIATION FIRE AND EXPLOSION REDUC-
TION (SAFER) ADVISORY COMMITrEE I (June 26, 1980) [hereinafter cited as SAFER
REPORT].
Id




' Id It should be noted the Committee published this report prior to the Saudi
Arabian Airlines loss of 1980 and DC-9 Air Canada loss of 1983. For a discussion of
the Saudi Arabian Airlines loss, see supra note 134. For a discussion of the DC-9 Air
Canada loss, see infra note 166.
'5 SAFER REPORT, supra note 150, at 13.
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test methods currently in use allow for a comparative test of
the materials and do not actually assess the effectiveness of
the material vis-a-vis cabin fire.15 The Committee found
that the bunsen burner tests for testing flammability of cabin
materials as now specified in the FAR's are valid tests, except
for analyzing those materials which melt and shrink away
from the flame.' 59 The Committee concluded that there were
not yet adequate test standards to measure the toxicity pro-
duced by the burning of cabin interior materials, nor a com-
plete data base on the hazards these toxic materials present to
humans. "6
The Committee recommended that a determination of
how cabin interior materials contribute to the post-crash fire
hazard be made. The Committee also recommended that fire
blocking or fire barriers be developed for aircraft seats in or-
der to retard fire spread. 16' The Committee suggested that
toxic research efforts should be stepped up with a research
program assigned the goal of providing a basis for future reg-
ulatory action. 162 The Committee proposed that FAR Part
25 on Flammability Test Methods be modified to account for
the melt and drip away behavior of various materials. ' 63 The
Committee also recommended that the FAA look into the use
of self-contained smoke masks, gloves, clothing or other items
of personal protection for crew members to allow better su-
pervision of evacuation procedures. 164 More importantly, the
Committee recommended that the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) and FAA improve and standardize
post-crash accident investigations as well as emphasize design
features of materials which affect the spread of post-crash
fires. 165
1 Id
mg Id at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 17. This latter recommendation is the subject of recent notice of proposed
rulemaking by the FAA. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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Not all experts agree with the SAFER Advisory Commit-
tee's determinations. For example, Dr. James G. Quintiere,
the group head of fire research at the National Bureau of
Standards testified at the NTSB hearing following a 1983 ac-
cident which involved Air Canada. 166 Dr. Quintiere pointed
out that current fire protection criteria concerning flamma-
bility resistance requirements of materials set forth in the
FAA regulations rely primarily upon bunsen burner type
tests.167 He classified these tests as only measuring
ignitability, which is not necessarily related to evaluation of
how materials will spread fire in a significant fire or delay
onset of flashover or flashfire.' 6 Dr. Quintiere added, how-
ever, that fire growth depends on more than just ignitability
of materials. He stated that the fire scenario, flame spread,
energy release and flame configuration are also determinative
and must be analyzed in conjuction with material tests.169
Mr. Richard G. Hill, Project Manager in charge of full-
scale fire testing for the FAA, also testified at the Air Canada
hearing. 7 ° When asked to discuss test criteria for fire resist-
ance set forth by the FAA, Hill stated that these tests evi-
On June 2, 1982 a DC-9, operated by Air Canada, experienced an in-flight fire
while enroute from Dallas/Ft. Worth to Toronto, Canada. Investigation of Air Ca-
nada Accident, supra note 95, at 6. The in-flight fire originated in the area of the aft
lavatory. The captain initiated an emergency descent and was forced to execute an
emergency stop on a runway at Greater Cincinnati Airport. Id at 6-7. As smoke filled
the cockpit and cabin, the aircraft lost all electrical power except emergency battery
back-up. Id. at 7. Only 18 passengers and 5 crew members were able to evacuate the
aircraft, the other 23 passengers died. Id The passengers presumably died from the
fire and its effects. The report, however, is not specific about the cause of death.
Id at 480, 570.
Id. at 570-71.
Id at 571.
, Id at 591. Hill stated that the fire in the subject aircraft originated in the aft
outboard corner of the rear lavatory. Id at 593. Hill discussed the use of fire detection
systems and fire extinguishers in lavatory areas and concluded that smoke detectors
could be effective if placed in a proper position. Id at 599. Hill said, however, that
there are many places a fire could start in a lavatory that a detector placed in a given
position or set at a given sensitivity could not detect. Id at 599. He also discussed
application of a fixed extinguisher in lavatories and observed that the Air Canada
aircraft did have a Halon extinguisher which uses a chemical that is most effective in
putting out fire in the aircraft lavatory trash can. Id at 601. Hill observed that there
are areas in the lavatory not accessible by a gaseous agent in the trash can, hence an
extinguisher so located may not combat a fire elsewhere. Id
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dently did not simulate fire scenarios such as that in the Air
Canada aircraft. 7 ' Some of the major component materials
used in the interior of Air Canada DC-9s were tested by Hill
using the standard tests of the FAR's. 7 2 He reported that a
portion of the urethane foam seat cushion so tested failed to
meet flammability requirements.'73 Hill opined that the fail-
ure may have been due to wear and body moisture on the
outer surface of the seat cushion causing the loss of fire re-
tardant properties.114
Hill also reported on his testing of a simulated wide-body
aircraft using materials commonly found in such aircraft
under a post-crash fire scenario. He concluded that fires were
sometimes survivable until flashover occurred. Flashover
rapidly decreased survivability because of heat, flame and
toxic gases.' 75 Hill concluded, therefore, that the most impor-
tant factor in post-crash fires is to reduce or delay the onset of
flashover or flashfire. 76
In Hill's opinion, the greatest obstacle to better cabin fire
safety is state-of-the-art and suitable materials. Wall panels
were chosen as an example. Hill stated that there are no
standard off-the-shelf side wall materials better than those
currently used in new aircraft.' 77 Hill believed that it is diffi-
cult to qualitatively rank materials because a material which
tests well in one situation may rate poorly in another. Fur-
thermore, Hill concluded that there are no tests that can be
correlated to actual full-scale fires because so many variables
are involved.178
VI. CONCLUSION
FAR's establish the standards that the government has de-
termined to be important. They are consequently of signifi-
71 Id. at 612-13.
172 Id at 618-19.
1- Id at 619.
,74 Id at 620.
,71 Id at 626.
" Id at 628.
,77 Id at 642.
178 Id. at 642-43.
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cance to the litigator, first as irrefutable standards, second as
standards which may influence requirements of proof, and
third as points of focus in the course of fire investigation.
These regulations are the logical starting point in any analy-
sis of a fire related accident.
A prerequisite to the successful prosecution or defense of a
fire related accident, however, is the correct determination of
fire origin and cause. Because this is a specialized discipline
requiring unique skill and training, a fire expert is
mandatory. Interested parties should endeavor to insure that
fire experts are retained as soon as possible after an accident
occurs. The expert should be given complete access to the
scene before evidence is disturbed. Preserving the evidence is
as important as obtaining specialized assistance.
Studies, commissions and public testimony demonstrate
that there are divergent opinions in connection with many
aspects of fire safety. Consequently, the careful litigator must
survey the literature, accident reports and studies on matters
related to his circumstance to enable a complete analysis of
the potential opinion range. Because there are differing opin-
ions in many areas of fire safety, litigants will discover that
many situations are not the subject of "conventional wis-
dom." If the litigation is sizable enough, it may be necessary
to conduct original research to verify hypotheses promul-
gated and to enable the provision of persuasive evidence to
the fact-finder of the correctness of a given approach.
This is an area of aviation accident litigation that has the
potential, through research, to be eradicated. Speaking for
those of us that spend substantial time aboard commercial
aircraft, it will not be missed.
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